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Abstract
Quantum key distribution (QKD) is a promising technology aiming at solving the security problem
arising from the advent of quantum computers. While the main theoretical aspects are well developed
today, limited performances, in terms of achievable link distance and secret key rate, are preventing
the deployment of this technology on a large scale. More recent QKD protocols, which use multiple
degrees of freedom for the encoding of the quantum states, allow an enhancement of the system
performances. Here, we present the experimental demonstration of the differential phase-time shifting
protocol (DPTS) up to 170 km of fiber link. We compare its performance with the well-known coherent
one-way (COW) and the differential phase shifting (DPS) protocols, demonstrating a higher secret key
rate up to 100 km. Moreover, we propagate a classical signal in the same fiber, proving the compatibility
of quantum and classical light.
The security of digital data is extremely important
in our society, due to the continuous exchange of sen-
sitive information. Classical cryptography is based
on mathematical assumptions which do not guaran-
tee information-theoretic security [1], i.e. a security
that cannot be broken with unlimited computational
power. However, quantum key distribution (QKD),
a branch of quantum communication (QC), provides
unconditional security based on the laws of quantum
physics [2, 3]. In the last 30 years, free-space, un-
derwater and fiber based experiments have demon-
strated the exploitation of different physical degrees
of freedom for QC protocols [4, 5, 6, 7]. Among
these, the differential phase reference (DPR) schemes
were proposed as a step towards easier implementa-
tions for fiber transmission schemes. They make use
of either the time of arrival of pulses, the phase dif-
ference between them or, more recently, both dimen-
sions to encode secure key bits [8, 9, 10, 11]. Further-
more, several quantum networks have already been im-
plemented [12, 13, 14, 15]. During the last decades,
the efforts of the scientific community were focused
on enhancing quantum communication performance in
terms of key rate, transmission distance and security
aspects [16, 17, 8, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24]. Here,
we present a practical implementation of the differen-
tial phase-time shifting (DPTS) protocol over 170 km
of single mode fiber, proving a higher secure key rate
compared with other protocols of the DPR family, such
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as the coherent one-way (COW) and the differential
phase shifting (DPS) [8, 10, 11]. Furthermore, we also
prove that a classical signal at a different wavelength
can coexist on the same optical fiber up to 90 km dis-
tance.
The DPTS protocol encodes the information in rel-
ative properties of consecutive weak coherent pulses
(WCPs). However, as opposed to the other DPR pro-
tocols, the DPTS exploits more than one degree of free-
dom at once, namely the position in time and the phase
difference among consecutive pulses. This allows the
DPTS to improve the secret key rate in an intra-city
network scenario (in terms of reachable distances and
channel loss), while at the same time being more robust
against channel noise as shown in Figure 1a) [8]. In the
DPTS protocol the information is encoded in four pos-
sible symbols in the alphabet {0, 1, 2, 3}, which are:
|0〉 = |±α〉 |vac〉 |±α〉 |vac〉 ,
|1〉 = |±α〉 |vac〉 |∓α〉 |vac〉 ,
|2〉 = |vac〉 |±α〉 |vac〉 |±α〉 ,
|3〉 = |vac〉 |±α〉 |vac〉 |∓α〉 . (1)
The terms |±α〉 and |vac〉 in eq. 1 represent a coherent
state of intensity α and a vacuum state respectively.
The ± sign represents the phase of the state. When
the two coherent states have the same (opposite) sign,
their phase difference is 0 (pi), see figure 1 a). When
the transmitter, usually called Alice, has prepared the
quantum states, she sends them through a quantum
channel towards the receiver, called Bob. To measure
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Figure 1: a) Theoretical secret key rates Rsk as a function of channel loss. DPTS (blue), DPS (orange) and
COW (yellow) secret key rates under the condition of beam splitting attack and BB84 with decoy state method (dotted
violet) secret key rate against collective attacks. Parameters: ν = 1.19 GHz, rdc = 100 Hz, η = 20%, td = 20 µs,
µDPTS = 0.26, µDPS = 0.13, µCOW = 0.52, µBB84 = 0.25 (signal), νBB84 = 0.08 and ωBB84 = 10
−10 (decoys)
photon/pulse; V = 0.98 and lint = 8 dB (DPTS, DPS and BB84); probability of decoy sequence pd = 0.1 (DPTS and
COW); N = 6 pulses/block (DPTS). Inset shows the encoding symbols in DPR protocols: filled pulses are WCPs, dotted
pulses are vacuum states. b) Schematics of the experimental setup. FPGA: field programmable gate array board;
continuous wave lasers: 1550 nm for quantum signal (C-band) and 1610 nm for classical signal (L-band); IM: intensity
modulator; PM: phase modulator; VOA: variable optical attenuator; BS: beam splitter; PWM: power meter; WDM:
wavelength division multiplexer filter; APD: avalanche photodiode; DLI: delay line interferometer; SPD: single photon
detector.
them, Bob uses a delay line interferometer, with delay
T = 2/ν (ν is the repetition rate), to sort among the 0
or pi phase difference. At the same time Bob measures
on each output of the interferometer the time of arrival
of the pulses. After the quantum communication pro-
cess, the sifting procedure takes place. Hence, Alice
and Bob share a sifted key and the following steps in
the protocol are given by the classical error correction
and privacy amplification. The equations for the fi-
nal achievable secret key rate, under the assumption of
beam splitting attacks, are reported in the supplemen-
tary materials [3, 8]. Figure 1a) shows a comparison of
the achievable secret key rate using DPTS, DPS and
COW from the DPR family and the secret key gener-
ated with the standard BB84 protocol with decoy state
method. To be noted that the BB84 protocol offers un-
conditional security [25], i.e. it is secure against collec-
tive attacks (the most comprehensive kind of attacks),
while the DPR protocols are secure against collective
beam splitting attacks. Even though a fair comparison
is not possible, it is also important to highlight that
the experimental implementation of the BB84 with de-
coy states requires more equipment, a more advanced
control unit to generate all the states in the mutually
unbiased bases and also a more complicated receiver.
The experimental setup used in the current exper-
iment is shown in figure 1b). To prepare the train
of time-encoded WCPs, Alice carves with an inten-
sity modulator a continuous wave laser at 1550 nm.
The obtained signal has an average block length of
N = 6 pulse/block (in a block there are only sym-
bols with the same time encoding [8]). The optical
signal is then sent through a phase modulator, which
imprints the required phase difference among consecu-
tive WCPs. Hence, Alice uses an optical variable atten-
uator to reach the quantum regime of |α|2 = µ ≈ 0.26
photon/pulse. With this value the secret key genera-
tion rate of the DPTS is maximized [8]. The WCPs
are then sent to Bob through a single mode fiber link
of variable length, from 10 km to 170 km. The loss
per unit distance of the fiber is 0.22 dB/km. At the re-
ceiver side, Bob uses a free-space delay line interferome-
ter with overall insertion loss of approximately lint ≈ 8
dB and visibility V ≈ 0.98 to infer the quantum states.
A phase difference of 0 is routed towards one output of
the interferometer, while a phase difference of pi con-
structively interferes on the other output. The two
outputs are then linked to two IDQ230 InGaAs sin-
gle photon detectors, which have the following param-
eters: efficiency ηdet = 20%, dark count rate rdc ≈ 100
Hz, dead time td = 20 µs and jitter tj ≈ 300 ps.
Both detectors are connected to a time tagging unit.
The electrical control at Alice’s side is given by a field
programmable gate array (FPGA) board whose three
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Figure 2: a) Measured QBER and b) experimental secret key rate. The color scheme used is: DPTS without
co-propagating classical channel (blue), with optical classical synchronization (green), DPS (orange) and COW (yellow).
Triangles report data collected using fiber spools as channel link, squares show data obtained emulating channel loss
with a VOA. Solid lines show the simulated results taking into account setup imperfections as intrinsic errors.
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Figure 3: Stability of the DPTS protocol. Experi-
mental QBER of the DPTS protocol at 50 km distance for
over 1 hour of continuous measurements. Inset shows the
QBER distribution.
electrical outputs are for the intensity modulator, for
the phase modulator and the synchronization signal.
The repetition frequency is ν = 1.19 GHz, the electri-
cal pulse width is of approximately 100 ps whereas the
obtained optical pulse width is around 150 ps. The syn-
chronization signal is either sent electrically to Bob’s
time-tagger unit directly from the FPGA or converted
into a classical optical signal which co-propagates with
the quantum channel. More details are reported in
the supplementary materials. To implement the DPS
and COW protocols, the setup is easily adapted. We
changed the delay of the optical interferometer in order
to have a fair comparison between the protocols, i.e. all
the protocols are implemented at the same transmitter
speed. Moreover, for the COW protocol, at Bob’s side
an unbalanced beam splitter is required so that most
of the time the pulses are directly received using one
single photon detector but sometimes, with a low prob-
ability, they are used to check coherence and therefore
sent to the delay line interferometer. For both pro-
tocols, the optimal mean photon number per pulse is
used in the implementation [8, 26].
Figure 2 shows the performance comparison of the
three protocols in terms of quantum bit error rate
(QBER) and secret key rate under the condition of
beam splitting attacks (when the synchronization sig-
nal is electrically sent to Bob). The triangles repre-
sent data collected for each protocol when the link be-
tween Alice and Bob is made by fiber spools (with dis-
tances ranging from 10 to 170 km with steps of 40 km),
whereas the squares are measurements taken when an
optical attenuator constitutes the channel, thus only
emulating fiber loss (from 5 to 40 dB losses with steps
of 5 dB). Solid curves represent simulations taking
setup imperfections into account. An intrinsic error
of et = 1.5% is estimated in the time domain, due
to the finite extinction ratio of the intensity modula-
tor during the carving procedure (for COW and DPTS
protocols), and an intrinsic error of ep = 0.5% affects
the phase domain, due to an imperfect modulation in
the phase modulator (for DPTS and DPS protocols).
Note that the bounds used in this work to compute the
achievable secret key rate are valid in the long distance
regime [26, 8], which is assured after approximately 5
dB of channel loss (corresponding to a ∼ 23 km link).
This is also shown in figure 2b), where the simulation
curves are dashed before reaching this regime. Finally,
as a preliminary demonstration of our system used in
real communication networks, we co-propagate a clas-
sical channel, carrying the optical synchronization used
for the QKD system, with the DPTS signal. This is ob-
tained by modulating a CW laser at 1610 nm. At the
receiver side, a first wavelength division multiplexing
filter (extinction ratio 60 dB) separates the two sig-
3
nals directing the synchronization to a photo detector.
The quantum channel is further filtered with a nar-
row band-pass filter with 3-dB bandwidth of 0.8 nm
around 1550 nm and extinction ratio of 40 dB. The
second filtering step is needed to further reduce the
leakage from the classical channel into the quantum
channel. The results are reported in figure 2a) and b)
with green triangle markers. The input power of the
classical channel was set to −27 dBm, minimizing the
impact on the quantum channel but ensuring enough
power for a successful detection with the photodiode.
The comparison of the three protocols shows that
for short-range links, i.e. up to 21 dB channel loss, the
achievable secret key rate is indeed higher when using
the DPTS compared to DPS and COW performances.
Note that the experimental values up to 5 dB attenu-
ation, for the DPTS and the DPS protocol, exhibit a
higher QBER than expected. This is mainly due to the
detectors’ saturation regime. For the COW protocol,
which does not rely on an interferometer with inser-
tion loss at Bob’s side, the detectors saturate up to
11 dB (50 km) of channel loss. An interesting channel
distance to consider is thus 50 km, where the bounds
conditions are valid. Here, the DPTS reaches a secure
rate of 34 kb/s with a system that is stable for over
one hour, as reported in figure 3. The DPS proto-
col is able to produce 25 kb/s of secret key rate and
the COW protocol produces only 2.7 kb/s in the ex-
perimental implementation, while the simulation curve
reaches up to 7.8 kb/s (saturation regime). The DPTS
protocol shows indeed an improved performance in the
secret key rate and a better robustness against noise
for applications in an intra-city scenario. On the other
hand, on longer distances the secret key rate drops
more rapidly than the other protocols, even though
a positive secret key rate can still be experimentally
obtained for a distance of 170 km. An intuitive expla-
nation to this is given by the fact that any error can
affect both time and phase domains: when the random
dark count clicks are comparable in number to the ac-
tual photon clicks, then this effect starts having a more
severe impact on the protocol performance. In the case
of co-propagation of classical and quantum signal, the
higher QBER and the respective decrease of the secret
key rate result from leakage from the classical channel
and the detectability of the classical channel itself. In-
deed, the information the classical signal is carrying is
crucially needed for synchronizing the quantum chan-
nel. The maximum distance we could achieve was 90
km with a secret key rate of 7.3 kb/s. To increase the
transmission distance it appears necessary to introduce
a more sophisticated filtering scheme, which would al-
low higher classical input power, and/or amplification
schemes for the classical channel.
In this paper, we demonstrated the DPTS protocol
over 170 km of single mode fiber and compared its per-
formance with other DPR protocols. We showed that
in an intra-city network scenario, the DPTS outper-
forms the other protocols for up to 21 dB channel loss
(about 100 km) under the assumption of beam split-
ting attacks. We also demonstrated that our scheme
can co-exist on the same fiber with classical light, nec-
essary for a complete deployment of QKD systems.
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